Ideas of Robin Le Poidevin, by Theme

[British, fl. 1996, Leeds University]

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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
15186 In the tenseless view, all times are equally real, so statements of the future have truth-values
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
22919 A thing which makes no difference seems unlikely to exist
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
15207 We want illuminating theories, rather than coherent theories
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
22926 In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
22932 We don't just describe a time as 'now' from a private viewpoint, but as a fact about the world
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
6866 It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
15190 Evil can't be an illusion, because then the illusion that there is evil would be evil
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
6867 Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
22927 The logical properties of causation are asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
22922 We can identify unoccupied points in space, so they must exist
22924 If spatial points exist, then they must be stationary, by definition
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
22923 Absolute space explains actual and potential positions, and geometrical truths
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
22928 For relationists moving an object beyond the edge of space creates new space
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
22931 We distinguish time from space, because it passes, and it has a unique present moment
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
22917 Since nothing occurs in a temporal vacuum, there is no way to measure its length
22921 Temporal vacuums would be unexperienced, unmeasured, and unending
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
15195 If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
15188 If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
22934 Time can't speed up or slow down, so it doesn't seem to be a 'process'
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
15191 At the very least, minds themselves seem to be tensed
15197 Fiction seems to lack a tensed perspective, and offers an example of tenseless language
15206 It is the view of the future that really decides between tensed and tenseless views of time
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
15198 In the B-series, time-positions are unchanging; in the A-series they change (from future to present to past)
15189 Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position
6865 A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
15187 It is claimed that the tense view entails the unreality of both future and past
15205 Tensed theorists typically try to reduce the tenseless to the tensed
15192 We share a common now, but not a common here
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
15193 The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis
22938 To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real
22939 The B-series doesn't seem to allow change
22940 If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it?
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
22947 An ordered series can be undirected, but time favours moving from earlier to later
22952 If time's arrow is causal, how can there be non-simultaneous events that are causally unconnected?
22953 Time's arrow is not causal if there is no temporal gap between cause and effect
22951 If time's arrow is psychological then different minds can impose different orders on events
22948 There are Thermodynamic, Psychological and Causal arrows of time
22949 Presumably if time's arrow is thermodynamic then time ends when entropy is complete
22950 If time is thermodynamic then entropy is necessary - but the theory says it is probable
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / i. Time and motion
22943 Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere
22945 The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
22937 If the present could have diverse pasts, then past truths can't have present truthmakers
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
22925 The present is the past/future boundary, so the first moment of time was not present
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
22944 The primitive parts of time are intervals, not instants
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
22942 If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 10. Multiverse
22946 The multiverse is distinct time-series, as well as spaces
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
15196 God being inside or outside of time both raise a group of difficult problems
22941 How could a timeless God know what time it is? So could God be both timeless and omniscient?